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WILL ARKANSAS GAME & FISH 
COMMISSION v. UNITED STATES  
PROVIDE A PERMANENT FIX FOR 
TEMPORARY TAKINGS? 
BRIAN T. HODGES* 
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission v. United States recognized that any government action that inter-
feres with the enjoyment and use of private property—whether permanent or 
temporary in duration—can give rise to a claim under the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. Yet dicta in the decision left many pondering whether 
significantly different tests will apply depending on the duration of the gov-
ernment invasion. This Article reviews the state of the law regarding tempo-
rary physical takings both before and after Arkansas Game & Fish with par-
ticular regard to the test applicable to physical invasions of limited duration, 
and to what degree the duration of the government invasion should influence 
the court’s resolution of a takings claim. The Article concludes that drawing a 
distinction between so-called “permanent” and “temporary” invasions, based 
solely on the duration of the government occupation, is meaningless when de-
termining liability under the Takings Clause. 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 
“It means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.” 
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s 
all.” 
Alice was too much puzzled to say anything; so after a minute Humpty 
Dumpty began again. “They’ve a temper some of them—particularly 
verbs: they’re the proudest—adjectives you can do anything with, but 
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not verbs—however, I can manage the whole lot of them! Impenetrably! 
That’s what I say!” 
—Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass Ch. VI (1872) 
INTRODUCTION 
Few constitutional provisions have generated more interpretive diffi-
culties than the Fifth Amendment’s mandate that private property may not 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.1 For reasons that proba-
bly owe more to case-by-case pragmatism than any concern for doctrinal 
clarity, the Supreme Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence has divided into 
two broad categories, commonly referred to as regulatory and physical tak-
ings, respectively.2 Regulatory takings typically occur when legal re-
strictions on the use of private property “go too far,” depriving the owner of 
essential attributes of ownership.3 Physical takings result from incursions 
onto private property (normally referred to in quasi-military terms as “inva-
sions” or “occupations”) by the government or by parties acting under gov-
ernmental authority.4 
In 1987, the Supreme Court ruled unequivocally that temporary regu-
latory takings—those whose adverse effects are terminated by subsequent 
repeal of the offending measure or by other remedial action—require just 
compensation for the period of the unconstitutional restrictions.5 Oddly, 
however, no such bright-line rule existed for temporary physical takings. 
That incongruity lay at the heart of one of the most significant takings cases 
to reach the Court in recent years, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. 
United States.6 
This case addressed the question of whether a physical invasion of 
property must continue in perpetuity to constitute a compensable taking 
under the Fifth Amendment. A unanimous Supreme Court held that it does 
not.7 The decision is significant because the Court recognized that any gov-
ernment action that interferes with the enjoyment and use of private proper-
ty can give rise to a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. There is no 
                                                                                                                           
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 2 See, e.g., STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 880–82 (4th ed. 2009) (contrasting 
physical takings jurisprudence with regulatory takings jurisprudence). 
 3 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922). 
 4 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 419 (1982) (hold-
ing that cable installation effected a permanent physical occupation on the landlord’s property, and 
was thus a taking). 
 5 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 318–22 (1987). 
 6 133 S. Ct. 511, 511 (2012). 
 7 Id. at 518, 522. Justice Kagan did not participate in the 8–0 decision. Id. at 523. 
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categorical exception for government actions that are temporary in duration. 
The Court’s decision closed a long-standing loophole in takings law that 
had allowed the federal government in this case to avoid takings liability for 
having repeatedly flooded the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission’s land.8 
The Arkansas Game & Fish opinion, however, is not without faults. In 
reaching the conclusion that there is no temporary-flooding exception to the 
Takings Clause, the Court left a host of important takings issues undecided, 
including the reach of the per se physical taking test set forth in United 
States v. Causby9 and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.10 By 
leaving this issue unaddressed, the Court left many pondering whether Ar-
kansas Game & Fish provides a permanent fix for the temporary takings 
question. 
This Article reviews the state of the law regarding temporary physical 
takings after Arkansas Game & Fish with particular regard to the questions 
of what test is applied to physical invasions of limited duration, and to what 
degree the duration of the government invasion should influence the court’s 
resolution of a takings claim. Part II provides an overview and analysis of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Arkansas Game & Fish. Part III discusses 
the existing confusion engendered by the Court’s discussion of “temporary” 
physical invasions in Loretto. In Part IV, the Article asks whether Arkansas 
Game & Fish changed the test applicable to temporary physical takings. 
And finally, in Part V, this Article concludes by considering whether there is 
any meaningful purpose for distinguishing so-called “permanent” invasions 
from “temporary” invasions when determining liability under the Takings 
Clause. 
I. THE ARKANSAS GAME & FISH CASE 
A. The Waterlogged Road to the Supreme Court, or,  
the Woods are Lovely, Dark, and Damp 
The Arkansas Game & Fish Commission owns 23,000 acres of hard-
wood forest in the Dave Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Ar-
ea, in northeast Arkansas.11 This land, which contains thousands of acres of 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See infra notes 22–37 and accompanying text. 
 9 328 U.S. 256, 264–67 (1946). 
 10 458 U.S. at 441 (“We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of 
property is a taking.”). 
 11 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 511, 515. The Arkansas Game & Fish Commission 
is an agency of the State of Arkansas. See About AGFC, ARK. GAME AND FISH COMM’N, 
http://www.agfc.com/aboutagfc/Pages/AboutMission.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2014), available at 
http://perma.cc/4C96-WZA4. The Commission’s mission is to manage the state’s fish and wildlife 
resources through habitat management, fish stocking, hunting and fishing regulations, and other 
programs. Id. 
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valuable bottomland hardwood trees such as nuttall, overcup, and willow 
oak, is used for timber harvesting, hunting, recreation, and wildlife habitat 
and conservation.12 Much of the property and trees were seriously damaged 
when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as part of a dam management 
plan, inundated the forest with flood waters for several consecutive years 
during the 1990s.13 
The Commission successfully sued the federal government for inverse 
condemnation in the Court of Federal Claims.14 The court found that the 
“government’s superinduced flows so profoundly disrupted certain regions 
of the Management Area that the Commission could no longer use those 
regions for their intended purposes . . . .”15 Although the Army Corps even-
tually stopped flooding the forest, the court concluded that “the damage 
done to the Commission’s property interest in its timber was permanent . . . 
and the Commission was preempted from exercising its property rights over 
its timber during and after the Corps’s deviations.”16 In conclusion, the 
Court of Federal Claims ruled that “the government’s temporary taking of a 
flowage easement over the Management Area resulted in a permanent tak-
ing of timber from that property . . . .”17 and ordered the Corps to pay ap-
proximately $5.6 million for the value of the timber destroyed by the floods, 
plus an additional $176,428.34 to restore the damaged recreation and con-
servation lands.18 
But, in a 2-1 decision in 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Feder-
al Circuit reversed the trial court’s judgment and concluded that, as a matter 
of law, government flooding of private property can never constitute a tak-
ing if it is the result of an “ad hoc” or “temporary” government policy: 
[I]n determining whether a governmental decision to release wa-
ter from a dam can result in a taking, we must distinguish be-
tween action which is by its nature temporary and that which is 
permanent. But in distinguishing between temporary and perma-
nent action, we do not focus on a structure and its consequence. 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 515–16; Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United 
States, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 600–01 (2009). 
 13 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 516. The Army Corps of Engineers operates 
Clearwater Dam 115 miles upstream from the management area. Between 1993 and 2000, the 
Army Corps deviated from its ordinary water release plans, which provided downstream farmers 
with longer harvest times but also resulted in several consecutive years of flooding on the man-
agement area. See id.; see also Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1369–
73 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 14 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 87 Fed. Cl. at 647. 
 15 Id. at 620. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 634. 
 18 See id. at 647. 
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Rather we must focus on whether the government flood control 
policy was a permanent or temporary policy. Releases that are ad 
hoc or temporary cannot, by their very nature, be inevitably recur-
ring [and therefore cannot constitute a taking].19 
Consequently, the majority reasoned, it was unnecessary to consider the 
extent to which the Army Corps’s actions interfered with the Commission’s 
rights in its property.20 According to the Federal Circuit, government-
induced flooding that is not permanent in duration can never qualify as a 
taking.21 
B. The Decision: Temporary Physical Invasions Can Give Rise to Takings 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a tempo-
rary physical invasion could be categorically excluded from the require-
ments of the Takings Clause. Specifically, the Court took review of the case 
on the question “whether government actions that cause repeated floodings 
must be permanent or inevitably recurring to constitute a taking of proper-
ty.”22 At first blush, the answer would seem to be easy. After all, the Court 
has repeatedly held that the government must compensate landowners for 
its temporary occupation of private property regardless of how short the 
duration of the occupation was.23 
But the Court’s treatment of temporary physical invasions has been in-
consistent throughout the years—particularly in regard to government-
induced, temporary flooding.24 The Court’s early flooding cases repeatedly 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 637 F.3d at 1377. 
 20 See id. at 1376 (“[W]e need not decide whether the flooding on the Management Area was 
‘sufficiently substantial to justify a takings remedy’ . . . because the deviations were by their very 
nature temporary and, therefore, cannot be ‘inevitably recurring’ or constitute the taking of a flow-
age easement.”) (citing Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 21 See id. at 1376–79. 
 22 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 518. 
 23 See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 117 (1951) (asserting that “the 
Fifth Amendment requires the United States to bear operating losses incurred during the period the 
government operates private property in the name of the public without the owner’s consent”); 
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1,  16 (1949) (finding that the federal government 
must compensate a laundry company for the value of the temporary use of its property); United 
States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 374, 380–81 (1946) (finding that the appropriation of a 
building for public use was a taking and the damages were equal to “the use and occupancy of the 
leasehold for the remainder of the tenant’s term”); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 
U.S. 373, 375, 382 (1945) (holding that the proper compensation for the short-term taking of a 
portion of a building was the “market rental value of such a building on a lease by the long-term 
tenant to the temporary occupier”). 
 24 See Randall J. Pick, Loretto v. Teleprompter: A Restatement of the Per Se Physical Invasion 
Test for Takings, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 373, 379, 381–83 (1983) (opining that Loretto solidified the 
Court’s historical treatment of temporary physical invasions as being different from permanent 
ivasions). 
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noted that the floods that gave rise to a taking had created a “permanent” 
condition on the land.25 Thus, in the 1924 case Sanguinetti v. United States, 
the Court stated that government-induced flooding must “constitute an ac-
tual, permanent invasion of land” to effect a taking.26 The modern physical 
takings case, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., generally 
summarized the early flooding cases as follows: “[T]his Court has consist-
ently distinguished between flooding cases involving permanent physical 
occupation, on the one hand, and cases involving a more temporary inva-
sion . . . on the other. A taking has always been found only in the former 
situation.”27 That decision, which drew a stark contrast between “perma-
nent” and “temporary” government intrusions, cast doubt on whether and 
under what circumstances a temporary physical invasion could give rise to a 
taking.28 And in specific regard to flooding, Loretto cited Sanguinetti for the 
rule that government-induced flooding will only constitute a taking if it 
constitutes an “actual, permanent invasion of land.”29 
Thus, the key question before the Court in Arkansas Game & Fish was 
what the Court had meant when it said that a physical taking must be per-
manent to trigger the constitutional mandate of just compensation.30 The 
United States argued that Sanguinetti established a per se rule that flooding 
must be perpetual in duration to trigger the constitutional obligation of pay-
ing just compensation,31 whereas the State of Arkansas maintained that 
compensation is due if the damage resulting from the invasion is substan-
tial, regardless of the duration of the invasion itself.32 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, resolved the apparent 
conflict between “temporary” and “permanent” flooding cases by tracing 
two threads through the Court’s takings case law.33 First, the Court analyzed 
its decisions concerning physical takings to conclude that all physical inter-
                                                                                                                           
 25 See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327–28 (1917) (concluding that a taking occurred 
where inevitably recurring floods created a “permanent condition” on the land); United States v. 
Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 468–70 (1903) (finding a taking where a dam caused the owner’s property to 
be “permanently flooded, wholly destroyed in value, and turned into an irreclaimable bog”); Pum-
pelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177–78 (1871) (a taking occurred when a dam 
caused “irreparable and permanent injury” to the owner’s land). 
 26 Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924). 
 27 458 U.S. at 428. 
 28 See id. (suggesting that a distinction should be made between permanent and temporary 
occupation of land for the purposes of determining a taking). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519–22; see infra notes 31–37 and accompanying 
text. 
 31 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519–20. 
 32 See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 25–29, 32–35, Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. 
Ct. 511 (No. 11-597), 2012 WL 2561162 at *25–29, *32–35.   
 33 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 518–22. The decision was 8-0; Justice Kagan 
did not participate in the case. Id. at 523. 
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ferences with private property—regardless of duration—are potentially sub-
ject to the Takings Clause.34 Second, the Court reviewed its government-
flooding precedents to determine whether there was any significance to the 
distinction between “temporary” and “permanent” floods.35 When read to-
gether, the Court found “no solid grounding in precedent for setting flood-
ing apart from all other government intrusions on property.”36 Accordingly, 
the Court held that “government-induced flooding of limited duration may 
be compensable” and reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision.37 
1. Takings Claims Are Not Subject to Per Se Defenses 
The Court began its analysis by restating two fundamental principles 
of its Takings Clause jurisprudence. First, the Takings Clause is “designed 
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”38 And second, “[w]hen the government physically takes possession 
of an interest in property for some public purpose,” it is obligated to com-
pensate the owner.39 Together, the Court explained, these principles pre-
clude the lower courts from adopting categorical defenses to takings 
claims.40 Instead, takings claims that do not fall within one of the court’s 
categories of per se takings must be considered on their individual merits: 
We have recognized . . . that no magic formula enables a court to 
judge, in every case, whether a given government interference 
with property is a taking. In view of the nearly infinite variety of 
ways in which government actions or regulations can affect prop-
erty interests, the Court has recognized few invariable rules in 
this area.41 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Id. at 518–19. 
 35 Id. at 519–22. 
 36 Id. at 521. 
 37 Id. at 519, 523. 
 38 Id. at 518 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
 39 Id. (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 322 (2002)). 
 40 See id. (noting that “most takings claims turn on situation-specific factual inquiries,” with 
the exception of categorical takings). 
 41 Id. The Court discussed two “bright lines” that denote categorical takings: permanent phys-
ical occupation of private property, and regulations that deprive a property owner of all economi-
cally viable use of land. Id. (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (permanent physical occupation of 
private property); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009 (1992) (depriva-
tion of all economically viable use of land)).   
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Thus, as a general rule, Arkansas Game & Fish holds that there are no cate-
gorical exceptions to liability for government actions that are temporary in 
duration.42 
2. A Temporary Physical Invasion Can Effect a Taking of Private Property 
The Court first reviewed its body of takings case law to determine 
whether a temporary physical invasion could give rise to liability under the 
Takings Clause. Arkansas Game & Fish recognized that, despite the Court’s 
past use of the terms “permanent” and “temporary” to describe takings and 
non-takings, the duration of a physical invasion by itself is not determina-
tive of whether the government may be held liable for a taking.43 That prin-
ciple of takings law, the Court noted, was “solidly established” by a series 
of cases concerning temporary property seizures during World War II.44 
In United States v. Pewee Coal Co., for example, the federal govern-
ment “possessed and operated” the property of a coal mining company for 
five-and-a-half months to prevent a nationwide miners’ strike in the middle 
of World War II.45 The Court in that case unanimously agreed that the gov-
ernment’s seizure was a taking, with no regard to the limited duration of the 
occupation.46 References to the temporary nature of the government’s pos-
session were considered only in the context of the amount of compensation 
due to the plaintiff.47 Other wartime seizure cases confirm the principle that 
short-term physical occupations can effect a categorical taking. These prec-
edents include Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, in which the govern-
ment was required to pay compensation for a laundry plant that was com-
mandeered for less than four years;48 and United States v. General Motors, 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See id. at 519 (“[W]e have rejected the argument that government action must be perma-
nent to qualify as a taking.”). Based on this rule, the Court indicated that it is not receptive to 
“slippery slope” arguments when it comes to takings law. Id. at 521 (noting the frequency with 
which the government raises slippery slope arguments in takings cases). Indeed, the Court rejected 
the federal government’s argument that allowing a temporary flooding case to proceed to the mer-
its would result in a deluge of takings cases for the logical fallacy that it was: “To reject a categor-
ical bar to temporary-flooding takings claims,” the Court explained, “is scarcely to credit all, or 
even many, such claims.” Id. 
 43 See id. at 518–22. 
 44 See id. at 519 (citing Pewee Coal, 341 U.S. at 114; Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 1; Gen-
eral Motors, 323 U.S. at 373). 
 45 See 341 U.S. at 115. 
 46 Id. (plurality opinion); id. at 119 (Reed, J., concurring); id. at 121–22 (Burton, J., dissent-
ing). 
 47 See id. at 117 (plurality opinion) (affirming a judgment for compensation in the amount of 
$2,241.26); id. at 119, 121 (Reed, J. concurring) (affirming the awarded sum on other grounds); id. 
at 121–22 (Burton, J., dissenting) (holding that a taking had occurred, but disputing the awarded 
compensation). 
 48 338 U.S. at 3–4, 7, 14–16. 
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in which the government was found liable for taking a portion of a building 
for a period of one year.49 
Perhaps the best known temporary invasion case is United States v. 
Causby, wherein the Supreme Court concluded that the noise and glare 
from military overflights effected a physical taking when they caused a 
farmer’s chickens to panic and die.50 In that case, the government secured a 
year-to-year lease of an airport for military purposes, to be terminated in 
twenty-five years or upon the end of World War II, whichever was earlier.51 
During the term of the lease, the government’s operation of the airport en-
tailed the frequent overflight of Causby’s home and chicken farm.52 The 
noise and glare caused by heavy, four-engine bombers, transports, and 
squadrons of fighters so interfered with the use and enjoyment of Causby’s 
property and the commercial viability of the farm that the Court held that 
the government had physically taken an easement for which just compensa-
tion was due.53 The fact that the government’s use of Causby’s farm was 
limited to a number of years did not deter the Court from concluding that 
the injury was tangible and extensive, and could give rise to a compensable 
taking.54 
Relying on these precedents, Arkansas Game & Fish explained that, 
since its World War II-era decisions, the Court has consistently “rejected the 
argument that government action must be permanent to qualify as a tak-
ing.”55 The Court reasoned that “[o]nce the government’s actions have 
worked a taking of property, ‘no subsequent action by the government can 
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which 
the taking was effective.’”56 And, citing Causby, the Court held that takings 
liability can attach to any temporary government action that results in “a 
direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the 
land.”57 
                                                                                                                           
 49 323 U.S. at 375–77, 384; see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 374–75, 
380–81 (1946) (plaintiffs received compensation under the Takings Clause for the temporary sei-
zure of their leasehold interests for about two-and-a-half years); Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 
282 U.S. 399, 405–08 (1931) (the government’s authorization of a third party to appropriate a 
river’s water flow for a period of ten months was found to effect a physical taking of a paper mill’s 
water rights). 
 50 328 U.S. 256, 259, 265–66 (1946). 
 51 See id. at 258–59. 
 52 Id. at 259. 
 53 Id. at 266–67. 
 54 See id. at 259, 267–68 (noting that Causby’s property was now unusable as a commercial 
chicken farm, and remanding for determination whether the government took a permanent or tem-
porary easement over the farm). 
 55 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519. 
 56 Id. (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 321). 
 57 Id. (quoting Causby, 328 U.S. at 266). In a footnote, the Court also explained that the pro-
spect that land can be reclaimed and restored after a physical invasion “does not disqualify a land-
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3. Temporary Flood Invasions Are Not Categorically Excluded from 
Takings Liability 
In light of the well-established principle that a temporary interference 
with property may rise to the level of a taking, the Arkansas Game & Fish 
Court turned to the federal government’s argument that “flooding is differ-
ent” and, therefore, deserves a special exemption to generally applicable 
physical takings rules.58 The Court reviewed its flooding cases to determine 
whether its use of the word “permanent” in relation to the flooding in San-
guinetti had established a per se rule that excludes temporary floods from 
the protections of the Takings Clause.59 The Court concluded that it did 
not.60 
The federal government’s argument relied primarily on Sanguinetti.61 
In that case, the government had constructed a diversion canal intended to 
protect downstream properties from seasonal flooding.62 Sanguinetti’s land, 
nonetheless, was repeatedly inundated during a period of record-setting 
rains and flooding.63 Sanguinetti sued and claimed that the canal project 
effected a taking by exposing his land to increased flooding.64 Sanguinetti, 
however, failed to show that the canal project caused increased flooding on 
his property or that his land was “overflowed for such a length of time in 
any year as to prevent its use for agricultural purposes.”65 As a result, the 
Supreme Court determined that there was no “permanent impairment of 
value” and therefore no compensable appropriation of Sanguinetti’s land.66 
Citing the Court’s early flooding cases, the Sanguinetti opinion explained 
that “in order to create an enforceable liability against the government, it is 
at least necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and 
constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an ap-
propriation of and not merely an injury to the property.”67 Six decades later, 
in Loretto, the Court parenthetically quoted Sanguinetti for the proposition 
                                                                                                                           
owner from receipt of just compensation for a taking.” Id. at 523 n.2 (citing United States v. Dick-
inson, 331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947)). 
 58 See id. at 519–21. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 520–21 (“There is certainly no suggestion in Sanguinetti that flooding cases should 
be set apart from the mine run of takings claims . . . . There is thus no solid grounding in precedent 
for setting flooding apart from all other government intrusions on property.”). 
 61 See id. at 519.   
 62 264 U.S. at 146–47. 
 63 Id. at 147. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 147, 149. 
 66 Id. at 149. 
 67 Id. 
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that government-induced flooding will constitute a taking if it results in an 
“actual, permanent invasion of the land.”68 
The federal government argued that Sanguinetti and Loretto estab-
lished a per se rule excluding temporary flooding from takings liability.69 
Arkansas Game & Fish rejected the federal government’s contentions. In 
regard to Sanguinetti, the Court noted that the case was decided on ques-
tions of “foreseeability and causation”—not the duration of the flooding.70 
Thus, when considered in its proper context, Sanguinetti’s use of the word 
“permanent” was only intended to summarize the facts of prior decisions, 
which had unsurprisingly involved permanent floods.71 Moreover, Arkansas 
Game & Fish noted that Sanguinetti’s discussion of temporary flooding 
“appears in a nondispositive sentence in Sanguinetti”—in other words, the 
passage was nonbinding dicta.72 Sanguinetti, therefore, could not be read to 
create a “blanket exclusionary rule[]” that excludes temporary flood inva-
sions from takings liability.73 
Loretto’s discussion of “temporary” and “permanent” invasions, how-
ever, required closer analysis.74 In Loretto, the Court generally summarized 
its flooding cases as having distinguished between flooding cases involving 
permanent physical occupation on the one hand, and cases involving a more 
temporary invasion on the other.75 Then, in a footnote discussing the poten-
tial viability of temporary physical taking claims, Loretto noted that the 
                                                                                                                           
 68 458 U.S. at 428 (quoting Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149). Ironically, even though Loretto used 
the term “permanent” to describe the physical occupation at issue in that case—the installation of 
a cable box—the statute at issue only required landlords to permit cable companies to install fa-
cilities on their properties for a limited and readily determinable period of time. See id. at 421, 439 
(the statute provided for a physical occupation for “[s]o long as the property remain[ed] residential 
and a [cable] company wishe[d] to retain the installation”). 
 69 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519–21 (stating with regard to the finding in 
Sanguinetti that “the Government would have us extract from this statement a definitive rule that 
there can be no temporary taking caused by floods” and that “[t]he Government also asserts that 
the Court in Loretto interpreted Sanguinetti the same way the Federal Circuit did in this case”). 
 70 Id. at 520 (citing Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 148). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821) (“[G]eneral expressions, in every 
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go 
beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit 
when the very point is presented for decision.”). 
 73 Id. at 520–21.For the same reason, Loretto’s parenthetical quotation of Sanguinetti cannot 
create a categorical exclusion to the Takings Clause. See id. (explaining that the court in Loretto 
created separate categories of “permanent physical occupations” and “temporary invasions of 
property” and did not intend to exclude flooding from either category). 
 74 See id. (noting that Loretto explicitly categorizes flooding as a temporary invasion of prop-
erty, despite some ambiguous language early in the opinion). 
 75 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428 (citing United States v. Kansas Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 809–10 
(1950); Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149; Cress, 243 U.S. at 316, 327–28; Bedford v. United States, 
192 U.S. 217, 225 (1904); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 468–70 (1903)). 
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Court’s “intermittent flooding cases,” like other cases involving temporary 
interferences with private property, “are subject to a more complex balanc-
ing test to determine whether they are a taking.”76 That footnote—while 
raising additional questions discussed below concerning the appropriate test 
for adjudicating temporary physical invasions—effectively resolved the 
question presented in Arkansas Game & Fish.77 The Court held that “there 
is thus no solid grounding in precedent for setting flooding apart from all 
other government intrusions on property.”78 
On the question presented, Arkansas Game & Fish was an unequivocal 
victory for the property owner. The decision reaffirmed the rule that any 
invasion that causes direct and substantial harm to property may give rise to 
a compensable taking: 
Because government-induced flooding can constitute a taking of 
property, and because a taking need not be permanent to be com-
pensable, our precedent indicates that government-induced flood-
ing of limited duration may be compensable. No decision of this 
Court authorizes a blanket temporary-flooding exception to our 
Takings Clause jurisprudence, and we decline to create such an 
exception in this case.79   
The decision, however, was accompanied by the Court’s expansive dicta 
about the variety of ways that duration can be relevant in a takings in-
quiry.80 And that dicta has the potential of further confusing courts and liti-
gants about what test applies to temporary physical takings.81 
II. IS THERE A COHERENT TEST FOR TEMPORARY PHYSICAL TAKINGS  
AFTER ARKANSAS GAME & FISH COMMISSION? 
At the outset of the opinion, the Supreme Court in Arkansas Game & 
Fish Commission v. United States confirmed the general rule that when “the 
government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some 
public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner.”82 
And, in specific regard to temporary physical invasions, the Court recog-
                                                                                                                           
 76 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12. 
 77 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 521 (stating that footnote 12 from Loretto 
demonstrates the absence of precedent for categorizing flooding separately from other takings 
cases). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 519. 
 80 See id. at 522–23. 
 81 See infra notes 82–118 and accompanying text. 
 82 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012) (quoting Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002)). 
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nized that a taking could occur “when government action occurring outside 
the property gave rise to ‘a direct and immediate interference with the en-
joyment and use of the land.’”83 But later, the decision indicated that, ac-
cording to a footnote to Loretto, “temporary limitations are subject to a 
more complex balancing process to determine whether they are a taking.”84 
And in extended dicta toward the end of the opinion, the Court provided an 
overview of various regulatory and physical takings inquiries in which the 
duration of a government act can be relevant to a takings claim: 
We rule today, simply and only, that government-induced flood-
ing temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption from 
Takings Clause inspection. When regulation or temporary physi-
cal invasion by government interferes with private property, our 
decisions recognize, time is indeed a factor in determining the ex-
istence vel non of a compensable taking. See Loretto, 458 U.S., at 
435, n. 12 (temporary physical invasions should be assessed by 
case-specific factual inquiry); Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S., at 342 (du-
ration of regulatory restriction is a factor for court to consider); 
National Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 93 (1969) 
(“temporary, unplanned occupation” of building by troops under 
exigent circumstances is not a taking). 
 
Also relevant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which the in-
vasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized gov-
ernment action. See supra, at 517 [discussion of causation and 
foreseeability]; John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 
138, 146 (1921) (no takings liability when damage caused by 
government action could not have been foreseen). See also Ridge 
Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355–1356 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 799 
F.2d 317, 325–326 (7th Cir. 1986). So, too, are the character of 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id. at 519 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946)). 
 84 Id. at 521 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 
n.12 (1982)). After Loretto, several commentators suggested that the Court’s reference to “a more 
complex balancing test” in footnote 12 meant that temporary physical invasions should be adjudi-
cated under the multi-factorial, ad hoc test developed in Penn Central for adjudicating non-
categorical regulatory takings cases. See, e.g., Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the 
Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 362–63 (2007) (“Physical encroachments that fall short of 
permanent physical occupations are known as ‘temporary physical invasions’ and are examined 
under the Penn Central three-factor test.”); Dennis H. Long, Note, The Expanding Importance of 
Temporary Physical Takings: Some Unresolved Issues and an Opportunity for New Directions in 
Takings Law, 72 IND. L.J. 1185, 1194 (1997) (noting that Loretto “declares that all (temporary) 
physical invasions . . . are to be subjected not to the per se test but rather to the Penn Central bal-
ancing test”).  
378 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:365 
the land at issue and the owner’s “reasonable investment-backed 
expectations” regarding the land’s use. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001). . . . Severity of the interference figures 
in the calculus as well. See Penn Central, 438 U.S., at 130–131; 
Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 
327, 329–330 (1922) (“[W]hile a single act may not be enough, a 
continuance of them in sufficient number and for a sufficient time 
may prove [a taking]. Every successive trespass adds to the force 
of the evidence.”).85 
If read in isolation, that passage can be confusing.86 After all, it lists, with-
out any differentiation, various tests that have been developed over the 
years to determine different types of takings in very different circumstanc-
es.87 But when read in conjunction with Loretto’s enigmatic footnote 12, the 
passage has the real potential of leading courts and takings litigants down a 
path never intended by the Court.88 
A. Confusion Arising from Loretto 
The reason for this confusion has more to do with the Court’s impre-
cise description of past takings decisions than anything doctrinal.89 In Loret-
to, a New York statute required landlords to permit cable companies to in-
stall facilities on their properties—not indefinitely, but only “[s]o long as 
the property remain[ed] residential and a [cable] company wishe[d] to retain 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522–23 (citations omitted). 
 86 See, e.g., Timothy M. Mulvaney, Foreground Principles, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 837, 847 
n.40 (2013); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Takings Case Set for Oral Argument at the SCOTUS on Jan-
uary 15, ENVTL. L. PROF BLOG (Jan. 13, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_
law/2013/01/takings-case-set-for-oral-argument-at-the-scotus-on-january-15th-.html, available at 
http://perma.cc/6EM9-7M25 (noting that the Court’s discussion of the Penn Central factors in this 
passage from Arkansas Game & Fish departed from the traditional understanding of the ad hoc 
regulatory takings test). 
 87 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522–23. For example, the Court recited the 
“intent or foreseeability” test that is applied as a threshold inquiry to distinguish physical takings 
from torts such as negligence and trespass. See Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 
1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Court also references the “reasonable investment backed expecta-
tions” test developed specifically for ad hoc regulatory takings in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City 
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The Court next refers to the “severity of the interference” 
inquiry, which requires substantially different analyses in the physical and regulatory contexts. 
Compare Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130–31 (noting that regulatory takings analysis relies on “both 
the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights”), with 
Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327, 329–30 (1922) (noting that 
a “continuance” of physical invasions in number and time may establish a taking, regardless of 
intent). 
 88 See infra notes 90–118 and accompanying text. 
 89 See infra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.  
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the installation.”90 The statute was challenged on the grounds that the forced 
acquiescence in the occupation of one’s property by third parties effected a 
taking, and this Court agreed.91 The Court observed that a temporary physi-
cal interference with property that falls short of an occupation, and regula-
tions that merely restrict property use, are properly analyzed under “a more 
complex balancing test”—presumably, the multi-factor balancing analysis 
of Penn Central.92 When the character of the regulatory action “reaches the 
extreme form of a permanent physical occupation,” however, the Penn Cen-
tral test can be unnecessary.93 In such cases, the character of the govern-
ment’s action becomes the determinative factor and can give rise to a com-
pensable taking without regard to other considerations.94 
This holding was based in part on prior decisions that recognized that 
even short-term physical occupations by the government may constitute per 
se violations of the Takings Clause, including Pewee Coal.95 The Loretto 
Court attached no significance to the fact that the Pewee Coal occupation 
was short-lived, focusing on the character—not the duration—of the gov-
ernment’s action.96 Indeed, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the contin-
ued vitality of these temporary physical taking cases as “paradigmatic” and 
“categorical” examples of takings for which compensation must be paid.97 
Inexplicably, however, while expressly relying on the analysis of Pe-
wee Coal, dictum in Loretto purported to distinguish a compensable “per-
manent physical occupation” from a mere “temporary invasion,” which 
would be subject to Penn Central’s balancing test.98 In an especially enig-
matic footnote, the Court noted: 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439. 
 91 Id. at 421. The question presented in Loretto was “whether a minor but permanent physical 
occupation of an owner’s property authorized by government constitutes a ‘taking’ of property for 
which just compensation is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.” 
Id. The New York Court of Appeals found that no taking had occurred under Penn Central’s multi-
factor balancing test applied to a physical takings; the court rejected as inapplicable the physical 
takings test of Causby. Id. at 425–26; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
423 N.E.2d 320, 330 (N.Y. 1981). The threshold issue, therefore, before the U.S. Supreme Court 
was whether Penn Central had supplanted the physical takings test. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425–26. 
On that question, the Court held that Penn Central did not change the test for physical takings. Id. 
at 426, 432. 
 92 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12. 
 93 Id. at 426. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 431–32. 
 96 See id. at 431 (stating that because of the “‘actual taking of possession and control,’ the 
taking was as clear as if the Government held full title and ownership”) (citing United States v. 
Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 116 (1951)). 
 97 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321; 
see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304, 318 (1987). 
 98 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428. 
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The permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupa-
tion distinguish it from temporary limitations on the right to ex-
clude. Not every physical invasion is a taking. . . . [S]uch tempo-
rary limitations are subject to a more complex balancing process 
to determine whether they are a taking. The rationale is evident: 
they do not absolutely dispossess the owner of his rights to use, 
and exclude others from, his property.99 
“This single judicial pronouncement is a principal source of the current un-
certainty in the temporary physical takings jurisprudence.”100 If, as the 
Loretto dictum suggests, Penn Central’s test applies to all “temporary” gov-
ernment incursions, then Loretto must be interpreted to have overruled sub 
silentio the wartime seizure cases, including Pewee Coal. Yet this is impos-
sible: Loretto unqualifiedly, expressly relies on Pewee Coal.101 A more 
plausible interpretation is that Loretto sought to relegate to Penn Central “a 
class of temporary takings claims in which the duration is less than some as 
yet unspecified threshold”—presumably less than the five-and-a-half 
months spanning the Pewee Coal occupation.102 
Courts have struggled to determine exactly which physical occupations 
are subject to Loretto, with conflicting results. In Preseault v. United States, 
plaintiffs owned land through which a railroad had for years owned an 
easement for its tracks.103 After the rail company abandoned the easement, 
plaintiffs expected the easement to revert back to them under state law.104 
But under an intervening federal statute, the government authorized transfer 
of the easement as a hiking trail to a neighboring town for a maximum of 
thirty years.105 Plaintiffs challenged the government’s action as a per se tak-
ing.106 The Court of Federal Claims found that the government’s forced 
transfer of the easement to a third party effected a physical occupation, but 
only a temporary one, because of the thirty-year lease limit.107 Consequent-
ly, the court analyzed the physical occupation under the Penn Central bal-
ancing test and held there was not a taking.108 But the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit subsequently reversed and held that is was error to 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Id. at 435 n.12. 
 100 Long, supra note 84, at 1194. 
 101 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 431. 
 102 Long, supra note 84, at 1194. 
 103 27 Fed. Cl. 69, 71–72, 75 (1992). 
 104 Id. at 81. 
 105 See id. at 81–82. 
 106 Id. at 86. 
 107 See id. at 95. 
 108 Id. at 95–96. 
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interject the Penn Central analysis into what was clearly a “physical occu-
pation case.”109 
In contrast to the trial court decision in Preseault stands Hendler v. 
United States.110 To combat ground water pollution, the federal government 
in Hendler requested access to plaintiffs’ property to install wells for moni-
toring and extracting waste migrating from a nearby site.111 Notwithstand-
ing plaintiffs’ refusal, government agents installed the wells anyway.112 
Plaintiffs challenged the government’s actions as effecting a taking. The 
Court of Federal Claims ruled in the government’s favor, but the Federal 
Circuit reversed.113 Consistent with the wartime seizure cases, the Federal 
Circuit held that the installation of wells on plaintiffs’ property constituted a 
physical occupation, and thus a per se taking—regardless of the finite or 
even short-term duration of the occupation.114 Addressing the government’s 
claim that the occupation was temporary, the Federal Circuit offered a dif-
ferent interpretation of “temporary” occupations than that of the Court of 
Federal Claims in Preseault: 
“[P]ermanent” does not mean forever . . . . A taking can be for a 
limited term—what is “taken” is . . .  an estate for years, that is, a 
term of finite duration as distinct from the infinite term of an es-
tate in fee simple absolute . . . . If the term temporary has any real 
world reference in takings jurisprudence, it logically refers to 
those governmental activities which involve an occupancy that is 
transient and relatively inconsequential, and thus properly can be 
viewed as no more than a common law trespass . . . .115 
Unless litigants closely read the Court’s temporary takings case law, 
the degree of confusion about the appropriate test will likely increase after 
Arkansas Game & Fish. Indeed, despite the Supreme Court’s insistence that 
physical and regulatory takings be treated differently,116 takings defendants 
have already begun to argue that Arkansas Game & Fish intended to over-
turn and replace the well-settled test for adjudicating physical takings with 
                                                                                                                           
 109 Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 110 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 111 Id. at 1369. 
 112 Id. at 1369–70. 
 113 Id. at 1367, 1368. 
 114 See id. at 1378. 
 115 Id. at 1376–77. Of course, other courts vehemently adhere to the view that all temporary 
physical takings be reviewed under Penn Central. See Juliano v. Montgomery-Ostego-Schoharie 
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 983 F. Supp. 319, 327 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that Hendler would 
“completely emasculate” takings law). 
 116 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39 (2005) (contrasting Loretto with Penn Central); see also 
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322–23. 
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one new, multi-factorial test that borrows inquiries from the Court’s regula-
tory takings cases.117 The purpose of this argument is plain—it is well-
known that landowners rarely prevail under multi-factor balancing tests.118 
  
B. Arkansas Game & Fish Should Refocus the “Permanent”  
Versus “Temporary” Inquiry 
Arkansas Game & Fish clearly missed an opportunity to directly ad-
dress the question from Loretto that has been a source of confusion and con-
flict among the lower courts. But that is not to say that the decision did not 
advance our understanding of the law of temporary takings. The Court took 
a small step toward resolving the confusion created by Loretto when it rec-
ognized that Causby, Pewee Coal, and General Motors involved temporary 
physical invasions.119 The Court also overruled Sanguinetti insofar as the 
decision held that temporary government-induced flooding is exempt from 
the Takings Clause.120 Thus, the bases upon which Loretto distinguished 
“temporary” from “permanent” physical takings are no longer valid.121 
So, what does the “permanence” requirement mean if this Court has 
repeatedly found physical invasions of limited duration to constitute “per-
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Supplemental Brief for the United States at 2–3, 7, 12–13, Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n 
v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Nos. 2009-5121, 2010-5029); see also Brief 
Regarding Impact of Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States on Order Dismissing 
Plaintiffs’ Takings Claims at 2 n.2, Big Oak Farms Inc. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 48 (2012) 
(No. 11-275L) (brief dated Feb. 22, 2013). 
 118 See generally Adam R. Pomeroy, Penn Central After 35 Years: A Three-Part Balancing 
Test or a One-Strike Rule? (Aug. 31, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2139729 and http://perma.cc/QTT8-9GB8 (demonstrating that plaintiffs rarely prevail 
in appellate courts relying on Penn Central). Balancing tests have proven entirely unworkable 
under this Court’s regulatory takings doctrine, and for that reason should be avoided where clear 
standards are available. See R.S. Radford & Luke A. Wake, Deciphering and Extrapolating: 
Searching for Sense in Penn Central, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 731, 735–36 (2011) (observing that the 
Penn Central balancing test remains shrouded in a “formless, directionless haze,” and noting the 
constant calls for further guidance from courts and commentators). Indeed, in the 32 years since 
Penn Central relegated (most) regulatory takings claims to its multi-factor balancing test, that area 
of takings jurisprudence has become a veritable jungle of contradictory opinions. See John D. 
Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 174–75 (2005) 
(arguing that the Penn Central balancing test, absent further clarification, will serve as nothing 
more than “legal decoration for judicial rulings based on intuition”). Penn Central and its progeny 
have remained rudderless, and commentators invariably agree that neither property owners nor 
government regulators have any way of rationally assessing takings liabilities under that regime. 
See Steven J. Eagle, Some Permanent Problems with the Supreme Court’s Temporary Regulatory 
Takings Jurisprudence, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 325, 352 (2003) (“[E]mphasis on balancing tests gives 
. . . no one much predictability.”). 
 119 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519. 
 120 Id. at 520–21. 
 121 Compare id. at 519–21, with Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430–35. 
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manent” physical takings subject to categorical treatment?122 Most immedi-
ately, it means that, standing alone, the duration of a physical invasion is not 
dispositive of whether a per se physical taking has occurred.123 It also sug-
gests that the words “temporary” and “permanent” are being used to elicit 
something other than just the duration of the government interference. A 
review of the Court’s takings cases confirms that suggestion.124 
The Court’s “permanence” requirement is intended to distinguish those 
physical intrusions that have the effect of dispossessing a property owner of 
his or her rights in the land from those that are so ephemeral as to result in 
the type of consequential harm that is typically only recoverable in a tort 
action.125 For an intrusion to give rise to a taking, the condition must be suf-
ficiently fixed and the harm substantial enough to be able to determine the 
extent to which the government’s interference dispossesses a landowner of 
his or her rights.126 For example, Loretto contrasted a “permanent physical 
occupation” from those “temporary and shifting” conditions that are akin to 
an “ordinary traveler, whether on foot or in a vehicle, pass[ing] to and fro 
along the streets. . . . The space he occupies one moment he abandons the 
next to be occupied by any other traveller [sic]”, as opposed to an invasion 
that becomes a fixed and stable condition of the property such that it dis-
possesses the owner of his or her rights.127 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text; see also First English, 482 U.S. at 318 
(“‘[T]emporary’ takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different 
in kind from permanent takings.”).  
 123 Legal commentators have noted that, despite confusion surrounding the use of the terms 
“permanent” and “temporary” in regard to physical invasion takings, the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly found temporary invasions to constitute takings. See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos, The Takings 
Clause in America’s Industrial States After Lucas, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 281, 293 (1993) (“While the 
Court has distinguished between ‘temporary physical invasions’ and ‘permanent physical occupa-
tions,’ after [First English], even temporary physical invasions may be per se takings, requiring 
just compensation for the time the property is occupied.”); see also John J. Costonis, Presumptive 
and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 543–46 
(1983) (noting that temporary physical invasions may constitute takings); David F. Coursen, The 
Takings Jurisprudence of the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit, 29 ENVTL. L. 821, 
832 (1999) (criticizing Federal Circuit decisions finding temporary physical invasions to be per se 
takings); Marcus J. Lock, Braving the Waters of Supreme Court Takings Jurisprudence: Will the 
Fifth Amendment Protect Western Water Rights from Federal Environmental Regulation?, 4 U. 
DENV. WATER L. REV. 76, 90 (2000) (noting that temporary physical invasions could justifiably be 
treated as per se takings after First English). 
 124 See infra notes 155–195 and accompanying text. 
 125 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428–29, 435–36 (noting that physical occupations substantially 
interfere with an owner’s property rights, whereas temporary invasions may only cause conse-
quential damages); see also Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1355 (citing Barnes v. United States, 538 F.2d 
865, 870 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (noting that “mere consequential injury” falls under the scope of tort law). 
 126 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428–29. 
 127 Id. (quoting St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U.S. 92, 98–99 (1893)). 
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That distinction finds its roots in the Court’s 1871 flooding decision, 
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.128 There, the landowner brought suit against two 
companies that, acting under state authority, constructed a dam across the 
Fox River that caused the water to back up and flood his land.129 The com-
panies argued that the flooding was not a compensable taking because the 
harm to the land was the consequential result of a public improvement pro-
ject.130 In other words, according to the companies, the flooding did not de-
prive the owner of his land; instead, it merely injured the land, for which 
there was no Constitutional remedy. The Court agreed in principle that the 
Takings Clause does not require compensation for consequential injuries.131 
The Court rejected the companies’ argument, however, because the term 
“consequential” had been used too broadly by the lower courts to excuse 
governments from the obligation to compensate landowners for actions that 
effectively took an interest in private property.132 The Court recognized that 
when the government causes a “serious interruption to the common and 
necessary use of property” the injury to the land is the “equivalent to the 
taking of it” and cannot be dismissed as a consequential harm.133 Applying 
this principle to flood invasions, Pumpelly held that “where real estate is 
actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other 
material, . . . so as to effectively destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a tak-
ing, within the meaning of the Constitution.”134 And when the government 
uses private property in a manner that inflicts “irreparable and permanent 
injury to any extent,” it must compensate the owner.135 
Shortly after Pumpelly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued an 
opinion in Eaton v. Boston, Concord & Montreal Railroad that elaborated 
on the type of injury that will give rise to a taking.136 In Eaton, a railroad 
company, acting pursuant to a state statute, removed a natural flood barrier 
while constructing tracks, which resulted in the occasional flooding of 
                                                                                                                           
 128 80 U.S. 166, 179–80 (1871). 
 129 Id. at 167–69. 
 130 Id. at 171–74. 
 131 Id. at 180–81. 
 132 Id. at 181 (“[W]e are of the opinion that the decisions referred to have gone to the utter-
most limit of sound judicial construction in favor of [finding no redress under the Takings Clause], 
and, in some cases, beyond it.”). 
 133 Id. at 179. 
 134 Id. at 181; accord United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United 
States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933); United 
States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903). 
 135 Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 177–78 (emphasis added); see also Lynah, 188 U.S. at 470 (“Where 
the government by the construction of a dam or other public works so floods lands belonging to an 
individual as to substantially destroy their value there is a taking within the scope of the Fifth 
Amendment.”). 
 136 51 N.H. 504, 513–16 (1872). 
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Eaton’s farmland.137 The railroad argued that the flooding did not rise to the 
level of a taking because it was temporary and the resulting damages were 
therefore too inconsequential.138 The court rejected this argument and noted 
that the impact was not a “mere personal inconvenience or annoyance” but 
involved “physical injury to the land itself, a physical interference with 
property rights, and actual disturbance of the plaintiff’s possession.”139 The 
court reasoned that “occasional innundation may produce the same effect in 
preventing the plaintiff from making a beneficial use of the land as would 
be caused by a manual asportation of the constituent materials of the 
soil.”140 “Taking of a part is as much forbidden by the constitution as taking 
the whole. The difference is only one of degree; the quantum of interest 
may vary, but the principle is the same”.141 Thus, the court concluded that 
“[c]overing the land with water . . . is a serious interruption of plaintiff’s 
right to use it in the ordinary manner” and effected a taking.142   
By rejecting the notion that duration alone is determinative of whether 
a taking has occurred, Arkansas Game & Fish should have the effect of re-
focusing courts and litigants on the fundamental principles found in the 
Court’s temporary takings case law. 
III. WHAT IS THE TEST FOR TEMPORARY PHYSICAL TAKINGS  
AFTER ARKANSAS GAME & FISH? 
There is a real danger that the Supreme Court’s overview in Arkansas 
Game & Fish Commission v. United States of various takings tests in which 
questions of duration may be relevant will be read as establishing a new, 
multi-factor test applicable to temporary physical takings. It is essential, 
therefore, to acknowledge what Arkansas Game & Fish says and what it 
does not say in regard to takings law. This Article then reviews the Court’s 
takings case law to determine what test applies to temporary takings. 
A. Arkansas Game & Fish Did Not Create a Hybrid  
Regulatory/Physical Takings Test 
As to the question whether Arkansas Game & Fish intended to change 
the test applicable to temporary physical takings, the answer is clearly “no.” 
                                                                                                                           
 137 Id. at 507. 
 138 Id. at 513. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 512 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 142 Id. at 513. “To turn a stream of water on to a plaintiff’s premises is as marked an infringe-
ment of his proprietary rights as it would be for the defendants to go upon the premises in person 
and dig a ditch, or deposit upon them a mound of earth.” Id. at 514 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
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A plain reading of Arkansas Game & Fish establishes that the Court did not 
intend to modify or overturn the test for adjudicating physical takings 
claims by incorporating inquiries from its regulatory takings cases into a 
new, multi-factor test.143 As noted above, the Court has long-recognized that 
physical takings and regulatory takings are distinct and separate legal con-
cepts:144 
The text of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for draw-
ing a distinction between physical takings and regulatory takings. 
Its plain language requires the payment of compensation whenev-
er the government acquires private property for a public purpose, 
whether the acquisition is the result of a condemnation proceed-
ing or a physical appropriation. But the Constitution contains no 
comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a property own-
er from making certain uses of her private property. . . . When the 
government physically takes possession of an interest in property 
for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate 
the former owner . . . regardless of whether the interest that is 
taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof. . . . But 
a government regulation . . . that bans certain private uses of a 
portion of an owner’s property . . . does not constitute a categori-
cal taking. “The first category of cases requires courts to apply a 
clear rule; the second necessarily entails complex factual assess-
ments of the purposes and economic effects of government ac-
tions.”145 
Accordingly, the Court held that physical and regulatory takings are 
subject to their own distinct rules: 
This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for 
public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private 
uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving 
physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a 
claim that there has been a “regulatory taking,” and vice versa.146 
                                                                                                                           
 143 Indeed, to reach the conclusion that the Court did intend to modify the test for physical 
takings, one would have to also conclude that Arkansas Game & Fish modified its regulatory 
takings test to include inquiries developed specifically to evaluate whether a physical intrusion 
upon private property effected a taking. 
 144 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–40 (2005); see also Tahoe-Sierra 
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322–23 (2002). 
 145 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321–22 (2002) (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 
523 (1992)) (citations omitted). 
 146 Id. at 322–23. 
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Inquiries designed to evaluate the extent of the government’s interference 
with an owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations “have served as 
the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not 
fall within the physical takings . . . rules.”147 Such inquiries are not proba-
tive of whether a physical invasion interferes with one’s rights in his or her 
property.148 
Subjecting a physical invasion to a multi-factor, hybrid regulato-
ry/physical takings test would represent a sea change in takings law. And 
such a radical change cannot be implied from reading one passage in isola-
tion. Indeed, Arkansas Game & Fish cautioned that a single passage from 
an opinion cannot be read out of context to create a rule that the Court did 
not intend: “[T]he first rule of case law . . . interpretation is: Read on.”149 
And when Arkansas Game & Fish is read in its entirety—and is read in 
context with the Court’s takings jurisprudence—it is readily apparent that 
the Court did not write that passage with the intention of modifying its well-
established takings tests. Nor did the Court intend that the passage overrule 
its past takings cases, such as Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency or Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
To the contrary, the Court expressly limited its opinion to the question 
whether temporary flooding was exempt from the requirements of the Tak-
ings Clause,150 and emphasized that it remains “incumbent on courts to 
weigh carefully the relevant factors and circumstances in each case, as in-
structed by our decisions.”151 And, far from overturning its past decisions 
establishing different tests for regulatory and physical takings, the Court 
relied on Tahoe-Sierra as setting out the proper test for physical takings.152 
It would be more consistent with the entire opinion and the Court’s takings 
jurisprudence to read the passage on pages 522–23 of Arkansas Game & 
Fish as providing examples of the various ways in which the duration of a 
government interference with private property can be relevant to a takings 
inquiry—a point that is directly responsive to the single question decided by 
the Court.153 Thus, despite the decision’s confusing overview of takings 
                                                                                                                           
 147 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. Similarly, the Court does not ask “whether a physical appropria-
tion advances a substantial government interest or whether it deprives the owner of all economi-
cally viable use.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323. 
 148 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323; see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432 (Penn Central “does not 
repudiate the rule that a permanent physical occupation is a government action of such a unique 
character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily examine”). 
 149 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 520 (2012). 
 150 Id. at 522. 
 151 Id. at 521 (emphasis added). 
 152 Id. at 518 (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322). 
 153 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 272 (1990) (“The Court often grants 
certiorari to decide particular legal issues while assuming without deciding the validity of ante-
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tests, the only conclusion that can be drawn from Arkansas Game & Fish is 
that tests that control physical invasion takings still control physical takings 
cases, and the tests that control regulatory takings still only apply in regula-
tory takings cases.154 
B. The Same Test for “Permanent” Invasions Has Always Applied  
to “Temporary” Invasions 
Arkansas Game & Fish confirmed the well-settled rule that when “the 
government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some 
public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former own-
er.”155 And in specific regard to temporary physical invasions, the Court 
recognized that a taking will occur “when government action occurring out-
side the property gave rise to ‘a direct and immediate interference with the 
enjoyment and use of the land.’”156 
This test for evaluating temporary physical taking claims grew out of a 
series of decisions wherein the Supreme Court applied the rules it had de-
veloped in early permanent occupation cases to physical invasions of in-
creasingly limited duration.157 In the 1903 decision United States v. 
Lynah,158 the Court found that a physical taking occurred when the govern-
ment placed dams, training walls, and other obstructions in a river in a 
manner that caused the water level to rise and partially inundate the plain-
tiffs’ land.159 Relying on the distinction between direct and consequential 
injury as set out in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. and Eaton v. Boston, Con-
cord & Montreal Railroad, the Lynah Court held that the government will 
be held liable for a taking when it causes a physical invasion of private 
property that results in a “serious interruption to the common and necessary 
                                                                                                                           
cedent propositions, . . . and such assumptions—even on jurisdictional issues—are not binding in 
future cases that directly raise the questions.”). 
 154 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522 (“[G]overnment-induced flooding tem-
porary in duration gains no automatic exemption from Takings Clause inspection. When regula-
tion or temporary physical invasion by government interferes with private property, our decisions 
recognize, time is indeed a factor in determining the existence vel non of a compensable taking.”); 
see also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323 (It is “inappropriate to treat cases involving physical tak-
ings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a ‘regulatory tak-
ing’ and vice versa”). 
 155 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322). 
 156 Id. at 519 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946)). 
 157 See infra notes 158–187 and accompanying text. 
 158 188 U.S. 445 (1903). 
 159 Id. at 467–68, 474. 
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use of property” or “so as to substantially destroy” the land’s value and ef-
fect a “practical ouster” of that land.160 
The first time a majority of the Court spoke directly to the effect of a 
temporary invasion was the 1910 decision United States v. Welch.161 There, 
once again, the Court was faced with a dispute whether injuries caused by 
government-induced flooding were direct or consequential.162 A dam on the 
Kentucky River permanently flooded a strip of land adjacent to Welch’s 
farm, which deprived Welch of the only practical way to access the county 
road from his property.163 The government admitted that it was required to 
compensate landowners for the value of the flooded property, but argued 
that the injury to Welch’s land was collateral and consequential—at most a 
tort.164 The Court rejected the government’s argument and held that the 
flooding, even though it occurred on land adjacent to Welch’s farm, had a 
direct impact on Welch’s right to access his land.165 The government flood-
ing effectively appropriated Welch’s interest in his right of way.166 The 
Court further explained, in a passage of importance to temporary takings 
jurisprudence, that even if the government had caused flood waters to enter 
and destroy private property, then stopped the flooding, its actions would 
still amount to a taking: “But if it were only destroyed and ended, a destruc-
tion for public purposes may as well be a taking as would be an appropria-
tion for the same end.”167 
Several years later, in United States v. Cress, the Court applied Pum-
pelly to conclude that government-induced flooding does not have to be a 
continuous condition on the land to rise to the level of a taking.168 In Cress, 
the federal government’s construction and operation of locks and dams on 
the Kentucky and Cumberland rivers caused the rivers and their tributaries 
to back up and intermittently overflow a portion of one plaintiff’s property 
and interfere with another plaintiff’s operation of a mill.169 The Court found 
                                                                                                                           
 160 Id. at 469–70, 472–73. Three Justices dissented and explained that they would have found 
no taking because the land could be reclaimed, thereby remedying any permanent injury to the 
property. See id. at 484 (White, J., dissenting). 
 161 217 U.S. 333 (1910). 
 162 See id. at 338–39. 
 163 Id. at 338. 
 164 Id. 
 165 See id. at 339 (“[B]oth petition and finding in substance show clearly that the way has 
been permanently cut off.”). 
 166 See id. 
 167 Id. The importance of this passage would manifest four decades later in the wartime sei-
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rule that the government’s temporary occupation and use of private property effected a taking for 
which compensation was required. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 378 
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that the periodic intrusions appropriated an easement because, during peri-
ods of overflow, the government’s actions directly and substantially inter-
fered with each landowner’s rights to make valuable use of his property.170 
The Court concluded that, although intermittent, the flooding directly inter-
fered with the landowner’s rights to possess, use, exclude others, and/or 
dispose of his or her property.171 Cress stated that “[t]here is no difference 
of kind . . . between a permanent condition of continual overflow by back-
water and a permanent liability to intermittent but inevitably recurring over-
flows.”172 The only distinction between permanent and intermittent flooding 
was that, in the latter circumstance, the landowner could retain possession 
of his land and the government would be obligated to compensate the owner 
for the value of the easement taken.173 Thus, Cress rephrased the Pumpelly 
test as follows: “[I]t is the character of the invasion, not the amount of 
damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, that deter-
mines the question of whether it is a taking.”174 
Later, in the 1947 case United States v. Dickinson, the Supreme Court 
found that government-induced flooding constituted a taking even though 
most of the affected land had been reclaimed prior to the takings claim be-
ing filed.175 The government constructed a dam as part of a project to im-
prove river navigability.176 The dam caused the water level to rise and flood 
the plaintiff’s land.177 Afterward, at great expense, the plaintiff reclaimed 
most of his land from the flooding.178 Dickinson concluded that, by subject-
ing the property to flooding, the government had exercised dominion over 
the land and, therefore, appropriated an easement for which just compensa-
tion was due.179 The temporary duration of the government’s invasion did 
not defeat the takings claim. The Court in Dickinson reasoned that, for the 
period of time the land was underwater, the government had taken the prop-
erty: “[N]o use to which Dickinson could subsequently put the property by 
his reclamation efforts changed the fact that the land was taken when it was 
taken and an obligation to pay for it then arose.”180 
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 171 See id. at 328, 330. 
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 173 See id. at 329 (“If any substantial enjoyment of the land still remains to the owner, it may 
be treated as a partial instead of a total divesting of his property in the land. The taking by con-
demnation of an interest less than the fee is familiar in the law of eminent domain.”). 
 174 Id. at 328 (emphasis added). 
 175 331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947). 
 176 Id. at 746. 
 177 Id. at 746–47. 
 178 Id. at 751. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
2014] Arkansas Game & Fish: A Permanent Fix for Temporary Takings? 391 
United States v. Causby is perhaps the most significant decision in this 
line of cases because the Court was directly confronted with the question of 
what test applies to a temporary invasion of private property.181 The Court 
began its analysis with the most basic tenet of takings law: A government 
act that destroys all uses of private property constitutes a taking for which 
just compensation is due.182 The Court reasoned that the same tenet should 
hold true whether the government takes an easement over a portion of prop-
erty, or whether the government only uses the land for a discrete period of 
time: 
There is no material difference between the supposed case [a 
complete occupation] and the present one, except that here en-
joyment and use of the land are not completely destroyed. But 
that does not seem to us to be controlling. The path of glide for 
airplanes might reduce a valuable factory site to grazing land, an 
orchard to a vegetable patch, a residential section to a wheat field. 
Some value would remain. But the use of the airspace immediate-
ly above the land would limit the utility of the land and cause a 
diminution in its value.183 
Accordingly, the Court applied the same test that it had applied in Pumpelly, 
Cress, and Portsmouth.184 Quoting Cress, the Court explained that “ . . . it is 
the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so 
long as the damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it is 
a taking.”185 The Court found that a taking had occurred because “the dam-
ages were not merely consequential. They were the product of a direct inva-
sion of respondents’ domain.”186 The government’s “intrusion was so im-
mediate and direct as to subtract from the owner’s full enjoyment of the 
property and to limit his exploitation of it.”187 
The question whether harm resulting from a government intrusion is 
direct or consequential does not require the courts to establish a new test. 
The well-established test for adjudicating physical takings already accounts 
for the directness of the invasion when determining whether a taking oc-
                                                                                                                           
 181 See 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946). 
 182 Id. at 261. The Court cited cases involving destruction of property by flooding to illustrate 
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curred.188 Under that test, the duration of the government intrusion is con-
sidered, along with other information, to determine (1) whether the invasion 
is the direct cause of the injury to the property, and (2) whether the injury is 
substantial enough to subtract from the owner’s full enjoyment of the prop-
erty and to limit his exploitation of it.189 If the injury to property is substan-
tial, it does not matter whether the injury was caused by an invasion of lim-
ited duration.190 The owner’s rights in his or her property are irreparably 
harmed because they are of a more limited and circumscribed nature than 
they were before the intrusion, and the government has a categorical duty to 
pay just compensation.191 
We know from the above discussion of Dickinson, Welch, and Lynah 
that the Court has found a taking where the duration of the flood was finite, 
making the invasion itself a temporary condition.192 We also know that nei-
ther Cress nor Causby relied on a balancing test; these cases established the 
rule that the “character of the invasion” is determinative of a physical taking 
case.193 And the Supreme Court relied on the rules and principles developed 
in its flooding cases to hold that the temporary physical invasions at issue in 
the wartime seizure cases and Causby effected takings.194 Thus, after Ar-
kansas Game & Fish’s recognition that Causby involved a temporary tak-
ing, there is nothing in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. that 
warrants application of a different test for government invasions of limited 
duration. 
                                                                                                                           
 188 See Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522 (citing Ridge Line, Inc. v. United 
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les, 482 U.S. 304, 306–07, 316–18 (1987) (relying on Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 177–78). 
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IV. IS THERE A MEANINGFUL DISTINCTION BETWEEN A TEMPORARY  
AND PERMANENT PHYSICAL INVASION? 
Given the significance that the Supreme Court has—at times—placed 
on the terms “temporary” and “permanent,” one would expect to find that 
the duration of a government interference provides some meaningful basis 
for distinction in the Court’s takings case law. But, as discussed above, that 
expectation does not bear out.195 Instead, we find remarkable consistency in 
the way that the Court resolves temporary and permanent physical takings 
cases. 
The Court’s consistent treatment is largely due to the nature of a physi-
cal appropriation of private property. The term “property” refers to the col-
lection of protected rights inhering in an individual’s relationship to his or 
her land or chattels.196 Among these are the rights to possess, use, exclude 
others, and dispose of the property.197 A government act that physically in-
trudes upon private property in a manner that substantially interferes with 
one of these rights constitutes a taking for which just compensation is 
due.198  Questions regarding the duration of the government invasion are 
only meaningful to the resolution of a takings case if the duration was so 
fleeting or temporary that it did not impact the owner’s rights in his land.199 
Compare, for example, Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. Unit-
ed States200 and Peabody v. United States.201 Both cases involved the same 
resort property, which was located adjacent to a military fort.202 In both cas-
es, the landowner claimed that the government had taken an interest in the 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See supra notes 155–195 and accompanying text. 
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property by shooting guns over the land.203 But, despite common facts, the 
Court concluded a taking might have occurred only in Portsmouth.204 The 
key distinction between the two cases was that in Peabody, the plaintiff was 
unable to show that the invasion substantially interfered with his property 
rights, but the plaintiff in Portsmouth did.205 In Peabody, the plaintiff 
claimed that the government had taken an easement over his land when it 
fired guns across the property on two or three occasions the year after it 
built the fort.206 There was no evidence that the government intended to fire 
the guns again in a time of peace; at best, the plaintiff showed a general ap-
prehension that the government might do so again at some point in the fu-
ture.207 His apprehension was insufficient to prove a taking.208 The Court 
explained that, to prove a taking, the plaintiff must show an actual interfer-
ence with the owner’s rights in his property: 
[I]f the Government had installed its battery . . . with the purpose 
and effect of subordinating the strip of land between the battery 
and the sea to the right and privilege of the Government to fire 
projectiles directly across it for the purpose of practice or other-
wise, whenever it saw fit, in time of peace, with the result of de-
priving the owner of its profitable use, the imposition of such a 
servitude would constitute an appropriation of property for which 
compensation should be made.209 
 In Portsmouth, however, the character of the government’s actions had 
changed in a significant enough manner for the Court to reverse a lower 
court’s order dismissing the takings case.210 The government replaced the 
old guns with heavy coastal defense artillery.211 Although the government 
only fired the new guns once—an inherently temporary condition—its es-
tablishment of a fire control indicated that it planned to do so again.212 
These facts, if proven on remand, could have been sufficient to establish 
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that the government’s temporary act of firing guns over the plaintiff’s prop-
erty had imposed a servitude on the land.213 
Once a government invasion of private property appropriates the rights 
therein, its character as a taking does not change if the government relin-
quishes control over the private property after using it for a period of 
time.214 In Professor Eagle’s classic treatise on regulatory takings, he ex-
plains that when the government causes a physical invasion of private prop-
erty for a limited period of time, it imposes a servitude on the land for the 
duration of the invasion.215 When the property is subsequently relinquished, 
the government exercises the appropriate right of alienation to return the 
property in its permanently diminished state to the owner.216 Although the 
owner of property that is taken for a limited duration of time may still hold 
some valuable rights in the land, those rights are irreparably harmed be-
cause they are of a more limited and circumscribed nature than they were 
before the intrusion.217 And, as recognized by Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission, “Once the government’s actions have worked a taking of 
property, ‘no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty 
to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effec-
tive.’”218 Accordingly, the Supreme Court recognized, in First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, that 
“‘Temporary’ takings . . . are not different in kind from permanent takings, 
for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.”219 
Although the Supreme Court has sometimes appeared to use the terms 
“permanent” and “temporary” to distinguish those physical intrusions that 
effect a taking from those that do not,220 its case law as a whole suggests 
that there is no meaningful distinction in the takings implications of a phys-
ical invasion that continues in perpetuity, compared to one of limited dura-
tion.221 As Justice Stevens noted in First English, in dissent,  “there is no 
distinction between temporary and permanent takings” in physical invasion 
cases:222 
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[I]f the government appropriates a leasehold interest and uses it 
for a public purpose, the return of the premises at the expiration 
of the lease would obviously not erase the fact of the govern-
ment’s temporary occupation. Or if the government destroys a 
chicken farm by building a road through it or flying planes over 
it, removing the road or terminating the flights would not palliate 
the physical damage that had already occurred. These examples 
are consistent with the rule that even minimal physical occupa-
tions constitute takings which give rise to a duty to compen-
sate.223 
It should be noted that Justice Stevens wrote this passage in dissent not 
because the majority of the Court disagreed with his analysis, but because—
unlike the majority—he did not believe that the same reasoning should be 
extended to regulatory takings. This led Professor Laitos to conclude: 
While the Court has distinguished between “temporary physical 
invasions” and “permanent physical occupations,” after [First 
English], even temporary physical invasions may be per se tak-
ings, requiring just compensation for the time the property is oc-
cupied.224 
Some analysts suggest that the judicial designation of physical inva-
sions as “permanent” or “temporary” may be little more than a semantic 
marker, signifying whether the court believes compensation is warranted on 
a case-by-case basis.225 Others have searched for some underlying con-
sistency in the Supreme Court’s use of these terms that departs from normal 
usage: 
[P]ermanency for doctrinal purposes is not synonymous with 
permanency in a temporal sense. Rather, it is a label attached to 
property interference of a sufficiently severe nature. Thus, in de-
veloping its [physical] takings doctrine, the Supreme Court has 
focused on the quality, not the duration of invasion. This was true 
in early cases and more recent cases. The Court has even viewed 
interference with limited term leaseholds as a compensable tak-
ing. Occasional, periodic, or intermittent occupations can also fall 
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within the rule. In contrast, an isolated, or technical trespass has 
been viewed as a temporary invasion. Indeed, the Court’s latest 
land use decisions reject any literal distinction between temporary 
and permanent interferences as determinative in either regulatory 
or [physical] takings cases. . . . “Permanency” is thus a legal 
conclusion, rather than an evidentiary fact.226 
As Stephen Blevit has noted: 
It almost goes without saying that “when the Court speaks in 
terms of a permanent physical occupation, it does not necessarily 
mean that the occupation is one which will last forever.” . . . The 
term “permanent” is really the Court’s shorthand way of describ-
ing which physical occupations, because of the character of the 
occupation, have a sufficiently severe effect on the property own-
er such that no public interest can outweigh the impact on the 
property owner. Thus, no further inquiry into the purpose of the 
governmental action is necessary. The temporal character of the 
invasion is a relevant consideration, but not controlling.227 
Questions concerning the duration of an invasion become meaningless 
if they are not probative of whether the government’s actions interfere with 
the owner’s rights and expectations in property. In an article surveying the 
Court’s temporary takings jurisprudence, Professor Eagle insightfully asked 
whether the word “temporary” has any real meaning in “a society marked 
by impermanence.”228 He explained that, putting aside the law’s attraction 
to broad “talismanic definitions,” such distinctions lose meaning in applica-
tion.229 For example, the “temporary” land use moratoria at issue in Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency lasted 
six years; whereas, the regulation resulting in a “permanent” deprivation of 
all use of economically viable land uses in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council was only in effect for two years.230  Professor Eagle cautions that 
such “standardless discourse about ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ [acts] 
simply magnifies the confusion” surrounding takings law.231 That point was 
illustrated in spades by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s 
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repudiated decision in Arkansas Game & Fish, where the court relied on the 
distinction between “permanent” and “temporary” government action as an 
arbitrary touchstone for deciding the case without any consideration of how 
the government’s repeated flood invasions interfered with the Commission’s 
property rights.232 
For all of the confusion that the Arkansas Game & Fish dicta may 
cause, the Supreme Court’s discussion of the various ways in which dura-
tion may be relevant to a takings claim should at the very least disabuse 
courts and litigants of the notion that the temporal character of a govern-
ment act, standing alone, is in any way dispositive of the claim.233 
CONCLUSION: A TEMPORARY FIX FOR A PERMANENT PROBLEM 
Without question, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States 
constitutes a major step forward in protecting property rights. The Supreme 
Court’s decision holds that there is no categorical exception to liability for 
government actions that are temporary in duration, nor is there any reason 
to treat one form of physical interference differently than other physical 
invasions upon private property. And in that regard, the opinion recognizes 
principles that should fend off future categorical rules limiting government 
liability under the Takings Clause. The decision, however, provides only a 
temporary fix for the temporary takings issue because it left unresolved the 
question how a court should review such a claim. The Court missed an im-
portant opportunity to correct an error in its case law. And as a result, the 
Court created an uncertainty in its takings case law that is likely to arise 
again. 
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